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V 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintif(7Appellee, 
v. 
BRIAN JAMES RUDOLPH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
The State concedes in its brief that a conviction based on insufficient evidence is 
plain error and an exceptional circumstance which this Court can address initially on 
appeal. State's Brief at 15, 21, 25. But, the State misapplies these exceptions, 
misconstrues the evidence, and confuses Mr. Rudolph's appeal issue. Stripping away the 
State's erroneous arguments reveals a simple issue for appeal: whether the State 
presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Rudolph committed the crime. Given that the 
victim, Mr. Davis, could not positively identify Mr. Rudolph shortly after the robbery 
and that Mr. Rudolph's appearance differed significantly from the robber's, the trial 
court plainly erred in submitting the case to the jury and failing to arrest the judgment. 
Regardless of the plain error analysis, constitutional and policy arguments require 
excepting insufficient evidence claims from preservation rules. Appellate review for 
sufficient evidence is necessary to secure criminal defendants' fundamental constitutional 
CaseNo.990534-CA 
Priority No. 2 
right not to be convicted absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, because 
the parties and trial judges have ample opportunity to evaluate and challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence at trial, insufficient evidence claims do not implicate the 
policies underlying preservation rules. The State not only fails to acknowledge these 
arguments but neglects to mention the majority of jurisdictions that either except 
insufficient evidence claims from preservation rules or do so, for all practical purposes, 
as plain error. In short, no compelling reason supports requiring defendants to raise a pro 
forma motion below to preserve an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence.1 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY AND 
FAILING TO ARREST THE JUDGMENT GIVEN THAT 
THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THE 
PERPETRATOR'S IDENTITY BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
Although the State concedes that the plain error exception applies to insufficient 
evidence claims, it contends that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction 
below. In doing so, the State misconstrues the evidence, glosses over Mr. Davis' failure 
to initially identify the perpetrator, and minimizes the differences between Mr. Rudolph 
and the robber. The State also attempts to avoid the sufficiency issue by erroneously 
'The issues raised in this brief are also before the Utah Supreme Court in State of Utah 
v. Sean Hale Holgate. No. 990313-SC. 
2 
claiming that Mr. Rudolph has changed theories on appeal. The State misapprehends 
Mr. Rudolph's appeal issue and fails to show that the evidence reasonably established the 
robber's identity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A. The State Failed to Establish the Perpetrator's 
Identity Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Given 
Mr. Davis' Failure to Positively Identify the 
Robber at the Show-up and the Differences 
Between Mr. Rudolph's and the Perpetrator's 
Hair and Earrings 
As the State's concedes in its brief, f,the 'plain error' and 'exceptional 
circumstances' exceptions [to normal preservation rules] are sufficiently broad to 
encompass any situation requiring Utah's appellate courts to consider a constitutional 
issue for the first time on appeal in the interest of justice." State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)); s_ee_State's Brief at 15. Indeed, other jurisdictions 
overwhelmingly concur that a conviction based on insufficient evidence is a plain error 
that can be raised initially on appeal. See, e.g.. United States v. Santistevan. 39 F.3d 250, 
256 (10th Cir. 1994); Horton v. State. 758 P.2d 628, 632 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); State v. 
Moriaritv. 914 S.W.2d 416, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
Given the State's concession, if the evidence was insufficient to convict Mr. 
Rudolph, the trial judge plainly erred in presenting the case to the jury and in not 
arresting the jury's verdict. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(o) authorizes trial 
judges to dismiss a charge that the State fails to support sufficiently at trial: 
3 
i 
r At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the i 
conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order 
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof, ? { 
upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to 
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
Utah R. Crim. Proc. 17(o). Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 similarly provides that "[a]t 
any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may . . . 
arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense[.]" i 
Trial judges must submit a case to the jury following the State's case if "'the jury 
acting fairly and reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable / 
doubt[.]'" State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Iverson, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (I960)). This Court will uphold a trial judge's decision to 
submit a case to the jury "'if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be 
reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'" Id (quoting State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)). 
The test for determining whether to arrest a judgment or to dismiss a charge at the 
conclusion of the evidence is the same as the standard for reviewing a conviction for 
insufficient evidence. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). Under that 
standard, "a trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an 
element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as 
4 
to that element." Id 
Mr. Davis' failure to conclusively identify the robber at the show-up plus the 
significant differences between Mr. Rudolph's and the robber's appearances established 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Rudolph was the perpetrator. At trial, the State stipulated 
that Mr. Davis informed the police during the show-up that he was only "about 50 
percent sure" that Mr. Rudolph was the robber. R. 157: 173-74. In its brief, the State 
represents that Mr. Davis merely testified that he was "less than 100 percent" sure that 
the police had captured the robber. State's Brief at 8, 9 & n.6, 26. However, Mr. Davis 
never made such a statement at trial. Rather, his actual trial testimony demonstrates that 
he did not remember what he informed the police: 
Q And you indicated that you weren't 100 percent 
sure. Do you recall telling the police how sure you were? 
A I gave 'em some percentage, but I'm not sure. I 
think [the police officer] asked me for some kind of 
percentage or something, and I was, I don't know. 
Q If it was 50/50, or 70 percent, either one of 
those, would that have been consistent with your memory? 
A It would have been something like that. 
Q It was clearly less than 100 percent? 
- .
 :
'' A Yes. '-• 
R. 156:92-93. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Davis confirmed that he could not remember what 
5 
i 
percentage he gave the police: 
Q You went and saw [the defendant] and you told ( 
the police that you weren't sure that that was the individual, 
you weren't 100 percent positive? 
A I said I wasn't 100 percent sure. • 
Q You told — in fact, you told the police that you 
were only 50 percent sure; is that correct? 
i • 
A Is that what I said?
 ( 
Q Tell me if you remember. Is it possible you told 
the police --
i A It's possible yeah. - v . 
R. 156: 99-100. 
Given this testimony coupled with the State's stipulation, the State cannot 
plausibly dispute that Mr. Davis informed the police that he was only "about 50 percent 
sure" that the police had caught the perpetrator.
 Aj 
Mr. Davis' "inconclusive" identification casts serious doubt on Mr. Rudolph's 
guilt. State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). As the State admits, single-
person show-ups are "inherently suggestive[.]" State's Brief at 26 (citing State v. Bruce, 
779 P.2d 646, 651 (Utah 1989)). Thus, Mr. Davis' failure to affirmatively identify the 
robber under such highly suggestive circumstances, less than an hour after the robbery, 
undermines his already weak "50-percent" identification. 
The circumstances of the robbery explain that Mr. Davis likely could not 
6 
positively identify the robber because he was distracted throughout the incident. When 
the robber entered the lobby, Mr. Davis divided his attention between looking at the 
robber's face and hands. R. 156: 94-95. After the robber brandished a gun, Mr. Davis 
focused his attention on the weapon. R. 156: 95-96. He then concentrated on retrieving 
the money from the cash drawer and concealing himself in the adjoining room. R. 156: 
81-84, 96-97. In addition to these distractions, it is well-established that "perceptual 
abilities are known to decrease significantly" under stressful events such as a violent 
crime. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489 (Utah 1986). 
The State maintains that Mr. Davis' positive identifications at the line-up and at 
trial negate his initial failure to conclusively identify Mr. Rudolph. State's Brief at 9 n.6, 
33. Current research on eyewitness identification contradicts the State's position. A 
person's memory is more accurate near the time of an event rather than months later. 
Long, 721 P.2d at 489. Moreover, the interval between an initial observation and a 
subsequent viewing affects the accuracy of an identification. "Research demonstrates that 
both the length of time between the witness's experience and the recollection of that 
experience, and the occurrence of other events in the intervening time period, affect the 
accuracy and completeness of recall." LI at 489. Specifically, witnesses tend to "add 
extraneous details and to fill in memory gaps over time, thereby unconsciously 
constructing more detailed, logical and coherent recollections of their actual 
experiences." IdLat490. And, although memories fade as time passes, witnesses' 
7 
reports erroneously tend to become more certain. I&_ 
Mr. Davis' exposure to Mr. Rudolph at the show-up further lessens the accuracy { 
of his subsequent identifications. Previous exposures to a person at a show-up ffreduc[es] 
the trustworthiness of subsequent line-up or courtroom identification." Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968). Thus, contrary to the State's conclusion that 
subsequent identifications bolster an initial failure to identify a suspect, it is undisputed 
that a witness's initial failure to identify a person diminishes the evidentiary value of later 
identifications. People v. Home, 619 P.2d 53, 57 (Colo. 1980); Browning v. State, 757 
P.2d 351, 354 (Nev. 1988). . 
These dynamics were apparently at work in this case. Although Mr. Davis saw 
Mr. Rudolph shortly after the robbery under highly suggestive circumstances, he was 
only "about 50 percent sure" that Mr. Rudolph was the perpetrator. As time passed, Mr. 
Davis became more certain about the robber's identity and contended at trial that he had 
no doubts about the identification. R. 156: 94. Just as the research on eyewitness 
identification establishes, these circumstances reduce the accuracy of Mr. Davis' 
identification. 
The differences between Mr. Rudolph's and the robber's appearances confirm the 
misidentification. Despite the State's efforts to rehabilitate Mr. Davis' trial testimony, 
the record demonstrates that Mr. Davis did not identify Mr. Rudolph's earrings as the 
robber's: 
8 
Q Now, did you happen to notice that when the 
defendant, when he came into the Deseret Inn, if he had any 
jewelry on at all? 
A He had earrings. 
Q How many earrings? 
A i One in each ear. 
Q Do you remember the color of those earrings? 
A I don't remember if they were gold or silver, 
but they were about the size of a wedding ring. 
Q What kind of design were they? 
A Just a plain. 
Q In other words, were they a knob or ~ 
A A hoop. 
Q Like a wedding band? 
A Circular. 
Q Let me hand you what's been marked as Exhibit 
15 [Mr. Rudolph's earrings]. What is that? 
A Uhm, a couple of earrings. 
Q Are they consistent or inconsistent with the 
earrings you saw on the defendant? 
A Uhm. I don't — to me, they appear to be plain, 
without any design on 'em when I saw 'em. * 
Q So you can't remember any design on 'em. As 




A Uhm, it seems like they were about this size, { 
perhaps slightly larger. 
R. 156: 129-30 (emphasis added). i v 
n The State's claims to the contrary, when given two opportunities to identify Mr. 
Rudolph's earrings as "consistent" with the robber's, Mr. Davis could not identify them. 
Rather, unlike the robber's earrings, the earrings at trial were not plain and they were 
different-sized. 
The State similarly attempts to dilute the uncontroverted evidence that Mr. 
Rudolph did not smell of hair gel or cologne. According to the State's brief, Mr. Davis 
could not smell Mr. Rudolph's hair at the show-up because a glass partition separated 
them. State's Brief at 9 n.6. Again, the State's own stipulation at trial contradicts its 
claim on appeal. At trial, the prosecutor conceded that Mr. Davis informed the police 
that "the suspect had smelled heavily of cologne, which the person he viewed didn't." R. 
157:174. 
Given this stipulation, the State cannot adequately account for the fact that Mr. 
Rudolph was odor-free at the time of his arrest. The State's explanation that Mr. 
Rudolph wetted his hair is unpersuasive given Mr. Davis's statement to the police that 
the robber smelled "heavily" of some substance. R. 157: 174. Mr. Davis similarly 
testified that the perpetrator smelled "very strongly" of hair gel or cologne. R. 156: 91. 
10 
Despite this strong odor, Mr. Rudolph had no such smell shortly after the robbery. 
Rather than concluding that Mr. Rudolph eliminated this apparently over-powering odor 
by washing his hair, the more reasonable conclusion is that Mr. Davis misidentified Mr. 
Rudolph. u 
The State's other arguments are similarly unpersuasive. The fact that Mr. 
Rudolph did not have a coat is ambiguous, at best. Any parent or acquaintance of a 
teenager or young adult knows that it is not uncommon for young people not to wear 
coats in cold weather. Moreover, the trial evidence established that young men who 
dress and look similar to Mr. Rudolph commonly frequent the bars and clubs near the 
Hilton Hotel. 
In addition, Mr. Rudolph did not necessarily lie about meeting his friends at the 
hotel. Rather, his responses to the police could have been incomplete because he 
planned to meet his friends later that evening. Nor is it unreasonable for a person 
concerned about safeguarding money to keep it in one's shoe. Finally, Mr. Rudolph's 
apparently false statements about entering the restaurant do not affect the numerous 
problems with Mr. Davis' failure to identify Mr. Rudolph. 
The significant differences between Mr. Rudolph and the robber, Mr. Rudolph's 
common appearance, and the weaknesses with Mr. Davis' inconclusive show-up
 :; 
identification prevented the jury from reasonably concluding that Mr. Rudolph robbed 
the motel. Because the jury could not have "'fairly and reasonably'" convicted Mr. 
11 
Rudolph, the trial judge plainly erred in submitting the case to the jury. State v. Adams. 
955 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Iverson. 350 P.2d 152, 153 { 
(I960)). Even assuming some evidence supported guilt, the evidence was "so * 
inconclusive . . . that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to" 
» 
whether Mr. Rudolph committed the crime. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 
1993). ''v,,,,::;-y >:v: ...r, - _ . . - • • . 
B. Despite the State's Protestations, Mr. 
Rudolph Has Consistently Challenged the 
Accuracy of the Identification Testimony, « 
not its Admissibility 
The State argues that this Court should not review this case for sufficient evidence 
because Mr. Rudolph has changed theories on appeal and now challenges the 
"admissibility" of Mr. Davis' identification testimony. State's Brief at 12, 20, 24, 25; see 
also State's Brief at 11,28-30. The State misapprehends Mr. Rudolph's appeal issue. 
Mr. Rudolph raises the same argument on appeal that he presented at trial: the jury could 
not reasonably convict him given the significant differences between Mr. Rudolph's and 
the robber's appearances coupled with Mr. Davis' failure to identify the perpetrator with 
more than "50 percent" certainty. 
The State boldly contends that Mr. Rudolph's appeal claim "is not that the 
prosecution evidence, if believed, is insufficient for conviction." State's Brief at 20. 
Rather, the State, purportedly quoting from Mr. Rudolph's brief, unequivocally asserts 
12 
that Mr. Rudolph argues that the evidence was inadmissible because it was the "product 
of'undue suggestion[.]'" State's Brief at 24. Despite this assertion, the phrase "undue 
suggestion" never appears in Mr. Rudolph's brief. 
The State confuses a constitutional challenge to the admissibility of identification 
testimony under State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), with the factors identified 
in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), that affect the sufficiency of such testimony. 
Those factors include the length of time the witness observed the suspect, any 
distractions or inattentiveness during the observation, the witness's fear and stress the 
crime caused, the length of time between observations, previous exposures to the suspect, 
the initial failure to identify the suspect, and the suggestiveness of show-up 
identifications. Long, 721 P.2d at 488-91. These factors are the same ones defense 
counsel raised on cross-examination, through a Long jury instruction and during closing 
arguments. R. 99-101: 156:98-100; 157: 188-201. These are the same arguments that 
Mr. Rudolph asserts on appeal. 
A review of Mr. Rudolph's opening brief establishes that he does not challenge 
the admissibility of the identification testimony. The entire theme of the brief attacks the 
sufficiency of the evidence based on the Long criteria. The Statement of the Issue and 
the headings in the Argument section of the brief attack the "sufficien[cy]" of the 
identification evidence. Appellant's Brief at 1, 22. Although Mr. Rudolph cited 
Ramirez, that case relies on the Long factors in its rationale for constitutionally limiting 
13 
< 
the admissibility of identification testimony. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 779-81. Any 
references to Ramirez or to the suggestiveness of the show-up identification merely 
bolster Long and only address the identification's accuracy, not its admissibility. 
Appellate counsel apologizes if the citation to Ramirez caused the State any confusion.; 
The State's confusion should not distract this Court from the fact that the evidence 
was insufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that Mr. Rudolph committed the crime. 
Accordingly, the trial judge plainly erred in submitting the case to the jury and in failing 
to dismiss the charge or arrest judgment following the jury's verdict. Utah Rules Crim. 
Proc. 17(o), 23. The trial judge's omissions require reversal. 
II. REGARDLESS OF PRESERVATION RULES, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REVIEW CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS FOR 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO 
REQUIRE THE STATE TO PROVE GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT AND BECAUSE THE RATIONALE 
FOR REQUIRING PRESERVATION DOES NOT APPLY TO 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE CLAIMS 
This Court should not apply preservation rules to insufficient evidence claims 
because due process demands that appellate courts review convictions for sufficient 
evidence to preserve the right not to be convicted absent proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In any event, the State cannot point to any reasonable justification to require 
preservation of such claims. Trial courts and the prosecution have ample opportunity at 
trial to respond to the claimed insufficient evidence. In addition, strategic concerns do 
14 
not apply. There is, thus, no policy justification for requiring preservation. And, contrary 
to the State's representations, arguably, a majority of jurisdictions except insufficient 
evidence claims from preservation rules. 
One of the most basic tenets of due process requires the State to establish every 
element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
316 (1979). Indeed, that right is "indispensable" to protecting the accused "'from 
dubious and unjust convictions[.]'" In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 364 (1970) 
(quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895)). Requiring proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a "'fundamental'" right under both the State and Federal 
Constitutions. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, Tf 13, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (quoting State 
\LSparics, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981)). 
Given the importance of that right, due process "compels the conclusion that any 
defendant found guilty on the basis of insufficient evidence has been deprived of a 
constitutional right" and that issue can be raised initially on appeal. State v. Adams, 623 
A.2d 42, 45 n.3 (Conn. 1993). Denying appellate review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence "'would be . . . a substantial denial of due process[.]'" State v. Green, 691 So. 
2d 1273, 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Peoples, 383 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (La. 
1980)). Accordingly, appellate review is "necessary to prevent a denial of fundamental 
rights." State v. Barker, 851 P.2d 394, 396 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). 
The State dismisses the importance of these "bedrock" due process principles, 
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Winship_, 397 U.S. at 363, and claims that the plain error exception sufficiently 
safeguards the right not to be convicted based on insufficient evidence. According to the 
State, "[universally, 'fundamental error' is treated as simply another expression of plain 
error or exceptional circumstances." State's Brief at 18 n.12. Admittedly, several cases 
that Mr. Rudolph cited in his brief concluded that "fundamental error" constitutes plain 
error for purposes of appellate review.2 Nevertheless, a close examination demonstrates 
that the better-reasoned cases do not lump the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
together with ordinary "'technical'" errors, as the State appears to do. State v. Jannamon. 
819 P.2d 1021, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
:
 Rather, these courts' description of convictions based on insufficient evidence as 
"fundamental error" or "manifest injustice" qualitatively distinguish insufficient evidence 
claims from other errors.3 In fact, several of these so-called plain error jurisdictions 
consider the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as so vital that they entirely 
2State v. Puaoi. 891 P.2d 272, 278 (Haw. 1995); State v. Moriaritv. 914 S.W.2d 416, 
422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Wittgenstein. 893 P.2d 461,464 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). 
3United States v. Zolicoffer. 869 P.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir), cert, denied 490 U.S. 1113 
(1989) ("failure to prove one of the essential elements of a crime is . . . fundamental error 
which may be noticed by an appellate court notwithstanding the defendant's failure to 
raise it in the district court"); State v. Jannamon. 819 P.2d 1021, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991) ("fundamental" error to convict based on insufficient evidence); Hornsby v. State. 
680 So. 2d 598, 598 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996) ("fundamental error"); State v. Moriaritv. 914 
S.W.2d 416,422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("manifest injustice"); State v. Wittgenstein. 893 
P.2d 461,464 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) ("fundamental error"). 
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disregard preservation rules and review for insufficient evidence sua sponte.4 By 
equating insufficient evidence with plain error, these courts have, for all practical 
purposes, excepted insufficient claims from preservation rules. 
Creating an exception for insufficient evidence claims is "necessary" to preserving 
criminal defendants due process rights and to avoiding unjust convictions. State v. J 
Barker, 851 P.2d 394, 396 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). To conclude otherwise, would tempt 
appellate courts to treat such claims as any other ordinary error that can be summarily 
dispatched. Such temptation is real given appellate courts' heavy caseloads and their 
inherent discretion to review issues in writing. State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 
1992). Due process requires more conscientious treatment. Designating insufficient 
evidence claims as an exception to preservation rules would underscore the significance 
of the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and would ensure that appellate courts 
thoroughly review insufficient evidence claims on appeal. 
This approach makes sense because the policies underlying preservation 
requirements simply do not apply. Even the State observes in its brief that the Rules of 
Evidence provide trial courts an opportunity to address the sufficiency of the evidence sua 
4United States v. Santistevan, 39 F.3d 250, 256 (10th Cir. 1994); Casadas v. People, 
304 P.2d 626, 627 (Colo. 1956); State v. Puaoi, 891 P.2d 272, 278 (Haw. 1995). The 
Indiana Court of Appeals not only allows insufficient claims to be raised initially on 
appeal, it also raises the issue sua sponte. Lycan v. State, 671 N.E.2d 447,457 n.13 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1996). 
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sponte in the first instance. State's Brief at 18. Rules 17(o) and 23 charge the trial court 
with dismissing an information or arresting judgment if the evidence fails to support a ( 
criminal charge. At least, two states agree that similar court rules allow trial courts ample 
opportunity to initially address insufficient evidence claims. Commonwealth v. Burke, 
687 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); State v. Granbv. 939 P.2d 1006, 1009 
(Mont. 1997). . .,
 ; / 
Likewise, a criminal trial provides the State with a forum to respond to any 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. The central purpose of a trial is to 
determine whether the State can meet its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Specifically, by contending on appeal that it thoroughly countered the defense 
arguments below, the State implicitly admits that it had sufficient opportunity to respond 
to the defense challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. See State's Brief at 23-24, 
28-29. 
Moreover, requiring criminal defendants to raise a pro forma motion to dismiss or 
to arrest the judgment does not promote the goals behind preservation rules of improved 
efficiency or avoiding unnecessary appeals. See State v. Applegate, 591 P.2d 371, 373 
(Or. Ct. App. 1979). A judge who fails to dismiss a charge or arrest judgment sua sponte 
undoubtedly would not do so simply because the defense presents a routine motion 
requesting such action. This is especially true in cases such as here where the entire 
defense centered on the sufficiency of the evidence and still the trial judge declined to 
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take any action. 
Finally, there is no conceivable strategic reason for not requesting a dismissal for 
the lack of evidence. Despite the State's valiant effort to prove otherwise, Mr. Rudolph 
has not strategically changed theories on appeal. Had Mr. Rudolph done so, the policy 
concerns supporting preservation would apply and this Court appropriately could refuse 
to review the new claim. See State v. Larocco. 665 P.2d 1272,1272-73 (Utah 1983) 
(refusing to review claim raised initially on appeal challenging admissibility of 
identification testimony). 
Contrary to the State's claim that only a "handful of jurisdictions" except 
insufficient evidence claims from normal preservation rules, a near-majority of states 
specifically do so. State's Brief at 16. At least 17 states specifically exclude insufficient 
evidence claims, either by appellate decision, statute or court rule.5 Adding to this list 
are, at least, six "plain error" states and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that for all 
5State v. Adams. 623 A.2d 42,45 n.3 (Conn. 1993); Smith v. State. 213 A.2d 861, 862 
(De. 1965); State v. Ashley. 889 P.2d 723, 728 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); People v. Turner. 
539 N.E.2d 1196, 1202 (111.), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 939 (1989); Mftari v. State. 537 
N.E.2d 469,474 (Ind. 1989); State v. Barker. 851 P.2d 394, 396 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); 
State v. Green. 691 So. 2d 1273, 1277-78 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Commonwealth v. Burke. 
687 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); People v. Patterson. 410 N.W.2d 733, 
738 (Mich. 1987); Walker v. State. 394 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. 
Granbv. 939 P.2d 1006,1008 (Mont. 1997); State v. Gardner 536 N.E.2d 1187,1188 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Miller v. State. 579 P.2d 200,203 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); State 
v. Electroplating. Inc.. 990 S.W.2d 211,220 (Term. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Alvarez. 
904 P.2d 754, 761 (Wash. 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(5); Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 
1124(A)(7). 
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practical purposes except insufficient evidence claims from preservation rules. These 
jurisdictions regard the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as so important that they 
either review for sufficient evidence sua sponte.6 or they define the lack of sufficient 
evidence as a denial of "fundamental" rights or a "manifest injustice."7 
The State's purported "majority" of jurisdictions that require preservation consists 
of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, the District of Columbia, and 20 state courts.8 
6Casadas v. People. 304 P.2d 626, 627 (Colo. 1956); State v. Puaoi. 891 P.2d 272, 278 
(Haw. 1995); see, e.g.. United States v. Santistevan. 39 F.3d 250, 256 (10th Cir. 1994). 
7State v. Jannamon. 819 P.2d 1021, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) ("fundamental - not a 
'technical' ~ error to convict a person for a crime when the evidence does not support a 
conviction."); Hornsbv v. State. 680 So. 2d 598, 598 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996) ("fundamental 
error"); State v. Moriaritv. 914 S.W.2d 416,422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("manifest 
injustice"); State v. Wittgenstein. 893 P.2d 461,464 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) ("fundamental 
error"); see, e.g.. United States v. Zolicoffer. 869 P.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir.), cert, denied 490 
U.S. 1113 (1989) ("fundamental error"). 
8Reed v. State. 717 So. 2d 862, 864 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Horton v. State. 758 P.2d 
628, 632 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); Hunter v. State. 952 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ark. 1997); 
Fields v. United States. 484 A.2d 570, 575 (D.C. Ct. App. 1984), cert, denied 471 U.S. 
1067 (1985); Fletcher v. State. 285 S.E.2d 762, 764 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); State v. 
Westeen. 591 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Iowa 1999); Knox v. Commonwealth. 735 S.W.2d 711, 
712 (Ky. 1987) overruled on other grounds Lane v. Commonwealth. 956 S.W.2d 874, 
876 (Ky. 1997), cert, denied 522 U.S. 1123 (1998)); State v. Bover. 392 A.2d 41,42 (Me. 
1978); Garrison v. State. 594 A.2d 1264, 1266 (Md. Ct. App. 1991); Smith v. State. 716 
So. 2d 1076,1078-79 (Miss. 1998); State v. McAdams. 594 A.2d 1273,1275 (N.H. 
1991); State v. Czarnicki. 10 A.2d 461,463 (N.J. 1940); People v. MacDonald. 675 
N.E.2d 1219,1220 (N.Y. 1996); State v. Himmerick. 499 N.W.2d 568, 573 (N.D. 1993); 
State v. Warner. 819 P.2d 1390,1392 n.2 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Sprik. 520 N.W.2d 
595, 601 (S.D. 1994); State v. Brooks. 658 A.2d 22, 28-29 (Vt. 1995); Flovdv. 
Commonwealth. 249 S.E.2d 171 (Va. 1978); Davis v. State. 181 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Wise. 
1970); Farbotnik v. State. 850 P.2d 594, 603-04 (Wyo. 1993): see, e.g.. United States v. 
Santistevan. 39 F.3d 250,256 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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Seven states appear not to have addressed the issue.9 
As these numbers illustrate, at the very least, a split of authority exists concerning 
whether appellate courts should except insufficient evidence claims from preservation 
rules. Considering that the plain error jurisdictions, including the Federal Circuit Courts 
of Appeal, essentially treat insufficient evidence claims as an exception, a majority of 
jurisdictions except these claims from preservation rules. 
The State further justifies not excepting insufficient evidence claims by noting that 
parties must preserve sufficiency issues in civil cases and that criminal cases do not 
differ. State's Brief at 17-19, 21-22. The analogy to civil cases misfires. Unlike civil 
litigants, criminal defendants have a fundamental, constitutional right under both the State 
and Federal Constitutions to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable. State v. 
Lopes. 1999 UT 24, ^ 13, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 17. In addition, the Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not specifically charge trial judges with sua sponte dismissing a case or 
arresting judgment for lack of evidence, contrary to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Compare Rules of Crim. Proc. 17(o) and 23 with Rules of Civ. Proc. 50 and 59. Further, 
since criminal procedure rules create an opportunity for trial judges to address the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the rationale for preservation does not apply. The State's 
analogy to the civil arena is unpersuasive. 
9These states are California, Nebraska, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, 
and West Virginia. 
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Rather, the due process and policy arguments detailed above demand that appellate 
courts except insufficient evidence claims from preservation rules. Because the State 
cannot countered these arguments, this Court should except insufficient evidence claims 
from preservation rules. r • . * *;,. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Brian James Rudolph requests this court to reverse his aggravated 
robbery conviction based on the lack of evidence. 
SUBMITTED this <HL day of March, 2000. 
^ ^ p ^ 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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